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Abstract - The advent of internationalized domain names 
(IDNs) has introduced a new threat, with the non-English 
character sets allowing for visual mimicry of domain names. 
Whilst this potential for this form of attack has been well 
recognized, many applications such as Internet browsers and 
e-mail clients have been slow to adopt successful mitigation 
strategies and countermeasures. This research examines those 
strategies and countermeasures, identifying areas of weakness 
that allow for homograph attacks. As well as examining the 
presentation of IDNs in e-mail clients and Internet browser 
URL bars, this year’s study examines the presentation of IDNs 
in browser-based security certificates and requests for 
locational data access. 
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1 Introduction 
 Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) allow for non-
latin characters to be present in domain names. There are a 
number of security issues associated with this. Primarily this 
comes from the potential impersonation of domains by an 
attacker. This attack is achieved through the use of non-latin 
characters, which are visually indistinguishable from their 
latin counterparts. The aforementioned attack is known as an 
IDN homograph attack. This paper aims to investigate the 
strategies utilized by current web browsers to mitigate the 
impact of these attacks.  
1.1 Instructions for authors 
 Domain names have been with us for a long time, first 
introduced in 1983 they provided a centralized means of 
abstraction for IP addresses (Mockapetris 1983, Mockapetris 
1983). Since their inception domain names have become a 
key player in the information security arena, a known domain 
name inspires trust on behalf of the average user and as such 
is a high value item for would be attackers. Internationalized 
Domain Name Homograph attacks represent one attack vector 
that such an attacker could leverage for his/her advantage. 
The initial implementation of domain names allowed only for 
alphanumeric characters and hyphens encoded as ASCII 
(Mockapetris 1983). In subsequent years it become apparent 
that this was an unacceptable limitation as audiences that 
make use of non-latin character sets were not able to have 
domains in their respective languages. In 1998 the initial 
work on Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) began. This 
work and subsequent work cumulated in 2003 with the 
publication of RFC3454, RFC3490, RFC3491 and RFC3492, 
a set of documents outlining the function and proposed 
implementation of IDN (Bell-ATL 2011). 
The proposed IDN solution made use of UTF-8 character 
encoding to allow for non-latin characters to be displayed. In 
order to enable existing DNS infrastructure to handle UTF-8 
domains a system known as Punycode was developed 
(Faltstrom, Hoffman et al. 2003). Punycode provides facility 
to represent IDNs as regular ASCII domain names, as such no 
changes are required for the majority of infrastructure 
(Costello 2003). An example of an IDN would be the domain 
name ☃.com, which would be represented as xn--n3h.com 
when converted to punycode. 
1.2 Attacks 
 A number of visually indistinguishable glyhps (known 
as homoglyphs) exist within the Unicode character space. An 
example pair of glyphs are Unicode 0067 “Latin Small Letter 
G” and its counterpart Unicode 0261 “Latin Small Letter 
Script G” which are visually indistinguishable from one 
another. The aforementioned glyphs can be seen below in 
Figure 1. 
ɡ           g
U+0047
Latin Small  Letter G
U+0261
Latin Small Letter Script G 
Figure 1 – Example of Homoglyph for “g” 
Homoglyphs can be combined with characters from other 
scripts to form a series of glyphs, which as a whole are 
visually indistinguishable from their English counterpart. 
When a client or server interprets these homographs however 
they are treated in a distinct manner. Through the use of this 
trait attackers are able to craft domain names, which look 
familiar but are hostile in intent. These attacks can be 
deployed in the same manner as regular email phishing 
attacks, aiming to entice a user into accessing a hostile 
website in the belief that it is the genuine site being imitated. 
These attacks have been employed to steal financial data, 
passwords and corporate information.  
Traditionally phishing attacks are mitigated through user 
education, encouraging users to check the legitimacy of links 
before clicking them, looking for unrelated URLs, not 
replying to emails asking for information if they are from an 
external domain name, etc. However when phishing 
campaigns are modified to make use of homograph domain 
names the ability for user education to provide mitigate is 
eliminated, as there is no way to make a visual identification 
of a fraudulent domain name.  Figure 2 shows two domain 
names, both visually identical, however they lead to separate 
websites, with the one to the right making use of U+0261 
rather than U+0047 for the second G. 
ɡoogle.com gooɡle.com  
Figure 2 – A pair of Homograph Domains 
 
1.3 Mitigation 
A number of countermeasures have been implemented in 
order to mitigate the effectiveness of this attack. The majority 
of these involve displaying punycode in place of the actual 
UTF-8 text. Punycode is an ASCII representation of a 
Unicode domain name, originally implemented as the domain 
name service infrastructure did not support Unicode (Costello 
2003). The punycode alternative is commonly displayed in 
both the address bar and the status bar on hover for a 
particular link. 
When identifying domain names to display in punycode, there 
are two main methods used. The first (used by internet 
explorer 7 and above) is to use punycode only when a domain 
using mixed-script is detected (Fu, Deng et al. 2006). The 
implications of this are that any domain, which is intended to 
be spoofed via the replacement of one or more characters, 
will be detected, however in the event that the entire domain 
name is made from a single script it will be presented as 
intended by the attacker. 
The other method employed by Mozilla Firefox and Safari 
both utilizes a whitelist in which all IDNs are presented as 
punycode unless they belong to a top level domain (TLD) that 
has policy in place preventing the spoofing of domain names 
in this manner. The policies employed via TLDs to prevent 
this attack often require that prior to registering a domain 
name containing homoglyphs, the registerer must own the 
domain name containing the western variant of those 
homoglyphs. In implementing this policy the IDN homograph 
attack is eliminated, however a number of TLDs have failed 
to implement this policy (Mozilla 2005). 
A final strategy involves the color coding of various scripts in 
URLs (Krammer 2006). In this method Cryllic scripts are 
highlighted one color, while western scripts are left 
uncolored. In this situation mixed script URLs become 
immediately visible to the user, even though the characters 
themselves are visibly identical. 
2 Testing strategy 
 For testing purposes we developed a virtual environment 
comprised of Windows 7 installation, which at the time of 
writing at all current updates applied. A snapshot was taken 
prior to the installation of web browsers or email clients.  
Four primary attack vectors were identified with regards to 
IDN homograph attacks in web browsers, corresponding to 
the four most prominent locations in which an IDN may be 
shown to the user.  If an IDN is shown in Unicode, a 
homograph attack could result in the user being tricked into 
believing that a URL is that of a legitimate website.  The four 
attack vectors, in order of prevalence, are: 
 The text shown in the browser’s address bar, after the 
“Go” (or equivalent) button has been pressed. 
 The text shown in the browser’s status bar while the 
mouse is over a hyperlink.   
 The text shown when viewing prominent information 
about a website’s SSL certificate.  As most users do not 
examine the details of a certificate, this attack vector 
relies upon the presentation of IDNs in immediately 
visible or accessible information. 
 The text shown when the user is prompted to share their 
location using geolocation services. 
In order to summarize the findings, an overall “Mitigation 
Rating” was calculated for each version of each browser 
tested.  A value of zero is awarded if the browser does not 
support a particular attack vector, for example a lack of 
support for IDNs or geolocation services.  A value of negative 
one is awarded if the browser supports an attack vector 
without mitigation against IDN homograph attacks.  A value 
of positive one is awarded if the browser supports an attack 
vector and does mitigate against IDN homograph attacks, for 
example by presenting IDNs in Punycode.  As the 
presentation of IDNs in the browser’s address bar is by far the 
most prominent and influential vector of attack, values of 
positive and negative two are awarded for this vector. These 
values are shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
Address Bar Status Bar SSL Certificate Location Request 
-2  (Unmitigated) -1  (Unmitigated) -1  (Unmitigated) -1  (Unmitigated) 
0  (No Support) 0  (No Support) 0  (No Support) 0  (No Support) 
+2  (Mitigated) +1  (Mitigated) +1  (Mitigated) +1  (Mitigated) 
Figure 3 – Mitigation Ratings 
By applying this metric, each browser version tested can be 
awarded a Mitigation Rating between positive five and 
negative five, representing a browser that supports and 
mitigates all attack vectors and a browser that supports but 
does not mitigate any of the attack vectors respectively. 
Numerous versions of five web browsers were tested, based 
on averaged current market share data from a number of 
sources (Clicky 2011).  Tested browsers were Internet 
Explorer (Microsoft), Firefox (Mozilla), Chrome (Google), 
Opera (Opera Software) and Safari (Apple).  The authors 
attempted to test the initial release of each major version of 
the browsers since 2003, when RFC3454, RFC3490, 
RFC3491 and RFC3492 and ICANN’s “Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names” were 
published.  All browsers were tested in a Windows 7 
environment.  The results of the testing are presented below. 
 
3 Results 
Internet Explorer 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
7.0 (2006-10) Punycode Punycode No Mitigation No Support +2 
8.0 (2009-03) Punycode Punycode No Mitigation No Support +2 
9.0.8 (2011-
03) 
Punycode Punycode No Mitigation No Mitigation +1 
Figure 4 – Results for Internet Explorer 
Support for IDNs was added to Microsoft Internet Explorer in 
version 7, released in late 2006.  IDNs in the address and 
status bars were shown in Punycode, and an icon providing 
further information about IDNs appears next to the address 
bar when one is used.  Support for geolocation services was 
implemented in the latest major version of the browser, 
version 9, released in March of 2011.  Internet Explorer 
currently offers no mitigation against IDNs in SSL certificate 
information or geolocation requests, showing them in 
Unicode.  While Internet Explorer has protected itself against 
the most significant vector of IDN homograph attacks since 
support for IDNs was implemented, SSL certificate 
information and geolocation requests are presented without 
any mitigating features. 
 
 
 
 
Firefox 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
1.0 (2004-11) None None None No support -4 
1.5 (2005-11) Punycode Punycode None No support +2 
2.0 (2006-10) Punycode Punycode None No support +2 
3.0 (2008-06) Punycode Punycode  Punycode No support +4 
3.5 (2009-06) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
3.6 (2010-01) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
4.0 (2011-03) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
5.0 (2011-06) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
6.0 (2011-08) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
7.0 (2011-09) Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
Figure 5 – Results for Firefox 
The first version of Mozilla Firefox was released in late 2004, 
and supported IDNs without any features to mitigate against 
homograph attacks.  From version 1.5, released 
approximately a year later, IDNs in the address and status 
bars were shown in Punycode.  From version 3.0, released in 
mid 2008, IDNs were shown in Punycode for SSL certificate 
information and were also placed more prominently in the 
interface.  When support for geolocation services was 
implemented in version 3.5, mid 2009, requests were shown 
in Punycode.  Firefox incorporated features that mitigate IDN 
homograph attacks fairly quickly, limiting its exposure in the 
two main vectors to a single major release. 
Google Chrome 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address 
Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location 
Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
1.0.154.59 (2009-04) Punycode Punycode Punycode No support +4 
2.0.172.27 (2009-05) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
3.0.197.11 (2009-08) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
4.0.302.3 (2010-01) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
5.0.396.0 (2010-05) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
6.0.495.0 (2010-08) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
7.0.544.0 (2010-10) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
8.0.552.224 (2010-12) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
9.0.597.16 (2011-02) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
10.0.648.205 (2011-03) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
11.0.696.77 (2011-04) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
12.0.742.112 (2011-06) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
13.0.782.218 (2011-08) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
14.0.835.202 (2011-09) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
15.0.874.21 (2011-09) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
16.0.904.0 (2011-10) Punycode Punycode Punycode Punycode +5 
Figure 6 – Results for Google Chrome 
Despite only being released a few years ago, Google has 
released sixteen versions of the Chrome web browser.  As the 
browser is in beta, the release cycle and version numbers are 
not as predictable as other browsers.  All versions present 
IDNs in the address bar, status bar, SSL certificate 
information and geolocation requests in Punycode.  Support 
for geolocation services was added in version 2 of the 
browser, released in mid 2009.  All versions of Chrome have 
included defences against IDN homograph attacks, however 
the fact that it was first released much later than any of the 
other major browsers must be taken into account. 
Opera 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
7.00 (2003-01) No support No support No support No Support 0 
8.00 (2005-04) No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
9.00 (2006-06) No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
10.00 (2009-
09) 
No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
11.00 (2010-
12) 
Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
11.51 (2011-
08) 
Punycode Punycode  Punycode Punycode +5 
Figure 7 – Results for Opera 
Version 7 of the Opera web browser, released early in 2003, 
did not support IDNs.  The next three major releases (in 2005, 
2006 and 2009) supported IDNs but offered no mitigation to 
IDN homograph attacks.  Support for geolocation services 
was added in version 11, late 2010, at which point IDNs in all 
attack vectors started to be shown in Punycode.  While all 
vectors are not mitigated against IDN homograph attacks, the 
browser was vulnerable to the attacks for approximately five 
years. 
Safari 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
3.1 (2008-03) No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
3.2 (2008-11) No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
4.0 (2009-06) No Mitigation No 
Mitigation 
No Mitigation No Support -4 
5.0.1 (2010-07) Punycode Punycode No Mitigation Punycode +3 
5.1 (2011-07) Punycode Punycode No Mitigation Punycode +3 
Figure 8 – Results for Safari 
Apple’s Safari browser began showing IDNs in Punycode in 
the address bar, status bar and geolocation requests from 
version 5, released in mid 2010.  Prior to that version, IDNs 
in the address and status bar were shown in Unicode and 
geolocation services were unsupported.  It is worthwhile 
noting that the default settings for Safari hide the status bar, 
nullifying the mitigation possible when hovering over a 
hyperlink.  No mitigation exists for SSL certificate 
information.  The authors also noted that the first HTTP URL 
to be entered into the address bar upon launching the latest 
version of the browser was shown in Unicode.  Successive 
URLs were presented in Punycode.  Safari was vulnerable to 
IDN homograph attacks for a number of years, and remains 
vulnerable in small areas. 
 
Figure 9 – Results Summary 
4 Conclusion 
The longitudinal data present from the nine years of software 
releases sampled provides interesting data. We can see that 
there is a strong trend towards effectively mitigating IDN 
homograph attacks in all products tested. However there still 
exists a need to ensure that location services and other 
potential areas of web browsers are secured in the same 
manner as the rest of the URL parsers & display mechanisms 
in the software. The lack of mitigation in some areas but not 
others in the same browsers suggests significant duplication 
of functionality in code, which is resulting in an increased 
attack surface. In order to better mitigate this issue it would 
be advantageous to consolidate these functions into single 
libraries which perform URL parsing, display and IDN 
homograph attack mitigation. 
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